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*266 INTRODUCTION
Since 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that corporations may “speak” in constitutionally protected ways;
that they may hold religious beliefs, at least for purposes of the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act (and perhaps
the First Amendment as well); and that they *267 may enjoy other privileges and rights heretofore assumed to be
enjoyed only by living, breathing people. 1 Despite the growing human features of otherwise intangible legal entities,
what has long been more central to the relationship between corporations and society has been what corporations
“know.” 2 Yet it remains a largely disputed question what factors courts, legislators, and regulators may or should
consider when determining whether a corporation “knows” or “should know” something, especially for purposes of
drafting and enforcing laws that shape its behavior or effectively divide its conduct from the people who manage it.
Indeed, it is frequently difficult to prove that a human being “knows” or “should have known” something relevant for
legal liability to attach; construing “knowledge” from many persons working within an entity committed to a business
purpose is far more complex. 3 In one case involving a corporate defendant with tens of thousands of employees, a
federal trial court instructed the jury that it could find that defendant “liable *268 for the collective knowledge of all
employees and agents within the corporation” when determining whether it had defrauded the federal government. 4
According to the instruction:
[I]f a corporation has many employees or agents, you must consider the knowledge possessed by those
employees and agents as if it was added together and combined into one collective pool of information.
If that collective pool of information here gives a reasonably complete picture of . . . false or fraudulent
claims or false statements, you may find that [Defendant] itself possessed a reasonably complete picture of
the false or fraudulent claims or false statements and acted knowingly. 5

With the instruction, the court captured one of the most vexing problems facing lawmakers, regulators as well as jurists:
how do you determine what a corporation “knows”?
Researchers from disciplines ranging from communications, economics, psychology, sociology, as well as law, have
endeavored to understand when and under what circumstances a corporation, as an entity, “knows” something or “has
knowledge” requisite for it to be held responsible for its action or inaction. 6 The precise question centers upon how and
in what form information is communicated between people within the firm, both across levels of firm hierarchy and as
information moves up that hierarchy. Economic theory suggests that information channels, including the language used
in those channels, will be shaped by costs and incentives. Rational firms, or at least firms in competitive environments,
adopt structures that minimize costs and maximize opportunities for profit *269 exploitation. 7 These structures are not
always welfare-enhancing at an aggregate or societal level. Information may be distorted or lost as it travels through the
firm that might improve product safety or provide a more complete picture of risks to investors. 8 These informational
distortions and barriers tend to coincide with cost-minimization and opportunity exploitation.
Judges, legislators, and regulators have always known of these possibilities. They have fashioned tools aimed at effectively
ensuring that information relevant to public safety, investor protection, and employee welfare, especially in large
organizations, is produced, communicated, and used appropriately with respect to these and other constituencies.
The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines issued by the U.S. Sentencing Commission, strict products liability, agent-
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principal fiduciary duties, and internal controls provisions of state and federal law have as their broader aim shaping the
way that information is created, transmitted, and used within the firm. 9 Economic, legal, and sociological scholarship
exploring the issue is legion. 10
This Article argues that an important source of data for answering the question of collective corporate knowledge has
been underappreciated if not *270 entirely overlooked: the federal False Claims Act. That statute requires that firms
submitting claims to the federal government for payment ensure that those claims are not knowingly or recklessly false. 11
Because the federal government undertakes its activities, often critical functions like healthcare provision and national
defense, through both small and large business entities, litigation under the statute provides a rich source of information
about when a corporation is deemed to “know” that its claim is false, how corporate structures and lexicology may
adapt to distort or suppress relevant knowledge, and what kinds of deterrence are necessary to effectively control those
distortions. 12
While the broader aim of this Article is to draw attention to an underutilized resource in the interdisciplinary corporate
collective knowledge debate, it does so out of two related concerns prompted by federal courts' current treatment of the
federal False Claims Act. First, the Article aims to address a split between federal courts on the question of whether
the collective corporate knowledge doctrine is authorized by the statutory language and history of the False Claims
Act. 13 The Article not only analyzes statutory text, history, and recent amendments, it also examines pre- and postclaims factors that strongly suggest a collective corporate knowledge instruction is an appropriate and necessary means
of effecting the False Claims Act's purpose. Second, a resolution of the judicial disagreement in favor of a collective
corporate knowledge doctrine is an important, even essential, aspect of implementation of the 2010 Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act, or, colloquially, Obamacare. 14 Although challenges to the economic structure of the law have
focused on mandates for individuals to participate in the insurance pool and subsidies *271 available through federal
and state exchanges, the cost of fraud in the healthcare system as a result of increased utilization represents a key financial
challenge for the law. 15 Indeed, the concern Congress expressed for fraud's potential to undermine the law represents
an important aspect of how the False Claims Act should be read by courts. 16
Part I of this Article surveys the problem of collective corporate knowledge as it is addressed in the legal literature.
This section analyzes the open questions and principal arguments made about the nature of information transmission
within the firm and how relevant knowledge may be distorted, suppressed or reframed. Part II introduces the federal
False Claims Act, its text, litigation structure, and relevant jurisprudence that shed light on the questions outlined in
Part I. Part II also surveys federal judicial treatment of the False Claims Act and the reasons courts have offered for
embracing or rejecting the collective corporate knowledge doctrine. Part III sets forth the reasons that the collective
corporate knowledge doctrine is not only supported by the text and history of the False Claims Act, but that it represents
a critical tool in ensuring the integrity of Obamacare as well as other federal health programs. Using healthcare sectors
that comprise the majority of federal spending - hospitals, hospice, and pharmaceuticals - the Article shows that not only
are large firms the principal beneficiaries of government payments, but that their systems for aggregating information
are, in fact, greater than the sum of any individual employee or agent. In Part IV, the Article places this conclusion in
broader context by examining the role collective corporate knowledge litigation under the False Claims Act may play
in the broader, multidisciplinary debate.
*272 I. THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE
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Between 1973 and 1980, at least 27 people died as a result of a structural flaw in the design and positioning of the Ford
Pinto gasoline tank that caused the tank to rupture and catch fire during certain common collisions. 17 One of the key
questions that faced regulators deciding whether to order a recall as well as judges and juries adjudicating lawsuits filed
against the manufacturer was: did Ford “know” about the defect? 18 The answer is not as clear as media coverage nor
product liability folklore suggest. 19 Ford introduced the Pinto amid significant competition from overseas automobile
manufacturers. 20 Attempting to convey the importance of the Pinto in keeping pace with the competition, Lee Iacocca
established the “two thousand, two thousand rule.” 21 “The manager in charge of the entire project . . . articulated the
criteria that the car needed to come in under two thousand pounds body weight and should sell for around two thousand
dollars to the consumer. When an engineering or design decision was referred to him, he constantly referenced those
two standards in deciding the issue.” 22 Subordinates learned not to refer decisions to management but to decide them
in terms of the short-hand framework provided. 23 Ford's Field Recall Coordinator at the time of the Pinto's *273
release “inherited about 100 active recall campaigns, half of them safety-related.” 24 As with most jobs, the enormous
workload required him to use both formal, “standard operating procedures,” and informal heuristics to organize and
manage information for decision making. 25 Nothing about the Pinto's safety profile at the time suggested any special
urgency with respect to fires caused by rear-end collisions. 26
Contemporaneously, Ford had commissioned a report to influence regulators, Benefits and Costs Relating to Fuel
Leakage Associated with the Static Rollover Test Portion of FMVSS 208, which assessed each victim of rear end collisions
of the type targeted by proposed federal rules at $200,000. 27 Ford's effort to fight new standards for “installation of
a special valve in all cars and light trucks to prevent fuel leakage . . . .” 28 together with the precarious design of the
gas tank made Ford appear to have made a calculated decision to favor its competitive position over consumer safety.
The design and release of the deadly automobile thus took place through hierarchical work organization, spontaneous
ordering of rules and the separation of corporate functions. 29 So what, if anything, may be said about what “Ford,” a
strictly legal entity, “knew” about the safety of the Pinto?
This problem of knowledge pervades a wide range of legislative and regulatory schemes aimed at ensuring that firms
generate relevant knowledge, use it appropriately, and guard it against distortion or destruction. Andrew Fastow “knew”
that the specialized investment vehicles he was using to hide Enron's true financial profile were illegal, but did the entity
called Enron? 30 Wal-Mart's operations in Brazil, China, India and Mexico expanded through bribes and corruption at
local levels, so *274 before a whistleblower alerted top executives, did Wal-Mart “know”? 31 By December 2000, data
from 21 trials showed that the risk of a heart- or stroke-related adverse event or death (from all causes) was twice as
high in patients taking Merck's analgesic Vioxx - but the finding was just shy of statistical significance - so did Merck
“know” about the risks four years before pulling the drug? 32
In each of the aforementioned contexts, illicit or tortious conduct was possible through the loss or distortion of
information in large, complex business organizations. The problem is inherent in the structure of profit-seeking firms.
Responsibility, whether with federal procurement rules or product safety, is diffused among firm divisions and individual
employees. 33 Because information travels from the transaction or person with which it originates to higher-level
decision-makers, a range of distorting influences may compromise the integrity of that knowledge or otherwise prevent
it from playing a role in legal compliance. 34 This aspect of complex business organizations is supported by scholars of
communications, economics, psychology, sociology, and law, notwithstanding differing disciplinary assumptions and
methods. 35
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Herbert Simon, for example, used the concept of “bounded rationality” to refer to the limitations and costs humans
face in acquiring and processing the full range of information required for optimal decision-making. 36 In the *275
context of a business organization, “bounded rationality” means that some individuals will not understand what is
being communicated, some individuals will hear or read information as something different than intended by the
communicator, or communicating parties will use specific words or phrases to suggest a range of possibilities which
might be embraced or denied depending on outcomes and results. 37 People within the firm “have to find a common
language to describe states of the world and actions with respect to which prior experience may not provide much of a
guide.” 38 Oliver Williamson coupled Simon's concept of “bounded rationality” with “opportunism” 39 to argue that
with respect to any given transaction involving a business organization (whether internally or in the course of armslength contracting) information would be shaped to the advantage of the speaking party. The essence of opportunism
“is an individual's aspiration to realize [[his or her] own egoistic interests, accompanied by cunning and deceit.” 40
Stanley Milgram famously, and controversially, showed that the superior-subordinate relationship generated phrases,
justifications, schemas, and heuristics that affected how information, particularly “orders” from superiors would be
read or interpreted against information and experience extraneous to that order. 41 In other words, people respond
differently to authority (and hierarchy) than they do in other contexts and their roles within an organization shape their
communications and conduct. 42 Philip *276 Zimbardo identified a long list of factors that tended to characterize the
authority relationship Milgram identified: presenting an acceptable justification, or rationale, for action; arranging some
form of contractual obligation, verbal or written, to enact the behavior; giving participants meaningful roles to play
that carry with them previously learned positive values and response scripts; presenting basic rules to be followed, that
seem to make sense prior to their actual use, but then can be arbitrarily mindless compliance; diffusing responsibility
for negative outcomes; and making “exit costs” high, and the process of exiting difficult by not permitting usual forms
of verbal dissent. 43 Legal scholars have translated these insights into specific legislative and regulatory regimes like
securities regulation, product liability, and organizational crimes to elaborate what the structure and dissemination of
knowledge means for legal compliance.
A. The Flow of Knowledge Within Firms
1. Structural Barriers to Effective Information Flow
In any organization, information must flow “upward” from employees that are directly connected to products and
customers, to mid-level managers, and finally to executives. 44 A key task for any firm becomes devising a system that
identifies important data and quickly moves it to the desk of the most appropriate manager or executive. 45 Information
arrives at the top of a firm's managerial chain only after having been filtered through multiple layers. 46 “Positive
information will move more quickly to the top,” but “[n]egative information will travel more slowly, if at all, and will
be more subject to skewing.” 47 As relevant information passes through these hierarchical nexuses it may be subject to
alteration and thus lose its urgency *277 or relevancy. 48 Further compounding the information flow problem is the
fact that accounting, auditing, and compliance systems are often expensive and only occasionally workable. 49
Even an affirmative managerial declaration that accurate or unbiased information should be passed upward along the
reporting chain may not be enough to overcome the aforementioned problems. As Langevoort notes, “[t]o the extent
that any given employee fears the possibility of being fired or dead-ended in light of a candid portrayal of the situation . . .
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distortion or concealment becomes a dominant strategy . . . .” 50 Indeed, this problem may be exacerbated by extensive
corporate compliance and training programs adopted by business organizations after 1991. An explicit pronouncement
that possible failures of compliance should be passed up the managerial chain may be contradicted by the implicit
understanding that the firm's compliance program exists to identify such failures, or, worse, merely window dressing. 51
There is also the possibility that a senior manager will cultivate, even unwittingly, an unspoken, implicit order against
the upward flow of negative information. 52 Lee Iacocca did so facing the necessity to produce a *278 small, affordable
car to compete with Japanese rivals. 53 Writing about the shocking effect of the Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom
scandals, Langevoort noted, “Senior managers were not candid with the company's directors. Other managers were not
candid with their superiors.” 54
The structure of corporate hierarchy, whether horizontal or vertical, will also exert influence on the generation and
processing of knowledge. If a team of peers is responsible for a certain function, introduction of potentially troubling
information by one member of a group gives rise to “a threatening form of stress.” 55 That stress generates an even more
permissive and aggressive attempt to rationalize and dismiss the threatening information. 56 This then inhibits a truly
prudent review of the information. 57
2. Cognitive Barriers to Effective Information Flow
Even without structural barriers to the effective flow of relevant knowledge, human limitations themselves will shape
the generation and transmission of knowledge in ways that may risk compliance with law. People commonly construe
information in a way that conforms to their prior assumptions, so that it fits within their pre-existing belief systems. 58 A
manager, acting alone, would tend unconsciously to resist the significance of information calling into question the validity
of a course of action. 59 Ambiguous or “potentially troubling” information is likely to be dismissed or rationalized so
that it does not conflict with the manager or firm's dominant belief system. 60 Compounding this problem is the fact
that most information is presented in a piecemeal, sequential manner, further *279 empowering a manager to dismiss
such information as non-conforming. 61 Despite the caveat that “much information is too unambiguous not to deflect”
where information can be interpreted that conforms to the desired belief it often will be. 62
Similar to cognitive conservatism is the way in which individuals bend or interpret information so that it conforms to
a prior conclusion. Correlations are often exaggerated if they support an initial hypothesis but downplayed if they do
not. 63 These tendencies reflect a decision-making modality that adheres to theory rather than evidence. 64 Additionally,
the more complex the evidence, the more vulnerable it is to this “confirmation bias.” 65 In many ways, complex
information is more easily dismissed as ambiguous, or more readily discredited than simple, easily quantifiable data. 66
Once an executive has made a decision, subsequent information is often reviewed and processed in a manner that is
biased to support the executive's original choice. 67 This is likely attributable to the fact that executives and managers
are often held accountable for their decisions, and so a natural tendency arises to protect the viability of the original
choice from disconfirming evidence. 68
*280 B. Legal Regimes Endeavoring to Structure Flows of Information Within Firms
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The number of state and federal regulatory efforts addressing these challenges to the effective generation and
transmission of information within the firm - with significant costs imposed on consumers, employees, investors, and
taxpayers - has proliferated since 1991 and the adoption of the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. 69 In 1996, the
Delaware Chancery Court - the most important court with respect to the internal governance norms at U.S. publicly
traded corporations - issued its consent decree in In re Caremark Derivative Litigation which articulated a heightened
duty on corporate directors for maintaining “reasonable information and reporting systems” later adopted as law by the
Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter. 70 In 2002, the federal government adopted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act which
expanded requirements for boards of directors of publicly traded corporations, management and public accounting firms
as well as certain evidentiary preservation provisions for privately held companies. 71 There are also regimes specific to
certain kinds of corporations - e.g. books and records provisions for firms doing business overseas who communicate
with foreign officials - but the ones outlined below are the most important for addressing the problems identified in
Part I.A. 72
1. Common Law Doctrines
Long before the compliance industry developed in the early 1990s, judges had fashioned common law doctrines that
provided relatively strong incentives for business organizations to effectively ensure that relevant *281 knowledge would
reach decision-makers or that firms would internalize costs imposed if it did not. As Stephen Croley and Jon Hanson
noted in their assessment of the tort reform battles of the early 1990s, the line of cases stretching from MacPherson
v. Buick Motor Co., 73 to Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 74 which expanded the strict liability doctrine for
consumer products, had at its core the generation and transmission of relevant information within the manufacturing
business organization and from the firm to the consumer:
Holding manufacturers liable for product injuries would solve this information problem . . . by forcing
manufacturers to provide greater safety and to be more forthcoming about product risks. Because
manufacturers would have to pay for accidents caused by their defective products, manufacturers would
be unable to profit from consumer ignorance. 75

The duty of candor, which operates in both agent-principal and corporate law contexts, similarly requires fiduciaries
to disclose relevant information in order to protect a wide range of stakeholders. 76 This duty most frequently arises
when a conflict of interest develops between corporate managers and the corporation. In order to show the fairness of
the transaction to the corporation, fiduciaries must fully and effectively disclose it. 77 Under Delaware law, the duty of
candor extends to any situation where directors seek shareholder approval, regardless of conflict. 78
Professor J.H. Verkerke argues the same with respect to courts' construction of employment contracts, disclosure rules
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, waivers related to tort liability and warranty provisions of the
Uniform Commercial Code as effectively forcing *282 relevant information to customers, employees, and the public. 79
In Verkerke's analysis:
The common thread that runs through all of these examples is that sophisticated contracting parties respond
to legal rules favoring their contractual partners by adopting express terms that shift the balance of legal
rights in their own favor. Traditional majoritarian default rule analysis would criticize these doctrines for
generating unnecessary transaction costs. On this view, the rules cause wasteful efforts to draft disclaimers,
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liability limitations, and other exculpatory clauses that appear in virtually every contract. The theory
of legal-information-forcing defaults provides an alternative, potentially more constructive role for these
doctrines. According to this perspective, the routine practice of contracting around such rules conveys
valuable legal information to comparatively unsophisticated parties. 80

2. Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
Like sentencing guidelines for individual offenders, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines were adopted both out of
a sense that wide variations in criminal sanctions gave rise to a perception that sentencing of corporations was arbitrary
and an even deeper sense that white collar crime was treated more leniently than other kinds of crime. 81 In contrast
to sentencing guidelines for individuals, the organizational guidelines focus on providing restitution and an appropriate
fine range for the offender *283 organization through far reaching probation provisions. 82 More importantly, the
guidelines are geared toward deterrence, and they provide sentencing benefits for organizations that have an “effective
program to prevent and detect violations of law.” Punishment consists of a fine that is calculated post-conviction, based
on either the victim's loss or the defendant's gain, multiplied by a factor set forth in the Guidelines promulgated by the
United States Sentencing Commission. 83 The organizational guidelines were not part of the original set of guidelines
the Commission sent to Congress on May1, 1987. 84 On November 1, 1991, after years of research, debate, and input
from several advisory working groups, various federal agencies, and the general public, the Commission promulgated
the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. 85
The response to the guidelines was a dramatic increase in the number of compliance and ethics programs. 86
The guidelines gave rise to an independent professional corps which developed its own self-regulatory bodies and
corresponding codes of professional ethics. 87 The Ethics and Compliance Officer Association, which was created in
1992 in direct response to the OSG with 19 members, now count more than 1,200 members exclusively comprised
of in-house compliance/ethics professionals--a job category that effectively did not exist in 1991. 88 The Society of
Corporate Compliance and Ethics, a nine-year old group that certifies compliance/ethics professionals, has more than
2,800 members comprised of both in-house and outside compliance/ethics practitioners, including service providers and
advisers. 89 Boards of directors receive regular reports from management on how their respective companies' *284
programs conform to OSG standards, and outside firms evaluate compliance/ethics programs against the OSG model. 90
Federal agencies, including the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Health and Human Services,
and the multiple agencies that collaboratively produce the Federal Acquisition Regulations modeled their industryspecific programs on the guidelines. 91 A number of policy-making bodies have incorporated compliance/ethics program
expectations within broader corporate standards. 92 The U.S. Department of Justice recognizes as a matter of policy
that a company's compliance program should be a factor in deciding whether or not DOJ will file criminal charges in
cases of organizational misconduct. 93 Many firms still reasonably look to the OSG in determining whether to monitor,
self-report, or cooperate. 94
Organizations may mitigate penalties through adopting an effective compliance program. This mitigation is contingent
upon prompt reporting to the authorities and the non-involvement of high level personnel in the actual culpable
conduct. 95 The OSG outlines seven key criteria for establishing an effective compliance program: oversight by high-
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level personnel; due care in delegating substantial discretionary authority; effective communication to all levels of
employees; reasonable steps to achieve compliance, which include systems for monitoring, auditing, and reporting
suspected wrongdoing without fear of reprisal; consistent enforcement of compliance standards including disciplinary
mechanisms; and, reasonable steps to respond to and prevent further similar offenses upon detection of a violation. 96
The OSG's “seven-step” standards for compliance/ethics programs have become the de facto framework for U.S.
corporations and also serve as a reference point for many U.S. regulatory and enforcement agencies. 97 For example,
Section 3 of Health Care Fraud and Abuse Compliance Manual essentially tracks the OSG criteria. 98
*285 3. Internal Controls
Common law mechanisms and the wave of compliance fostered by the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines failed to
prevent major episodes of corporate malfeasance beginning in the early 2000s with discoveries of accounting fraud at
several Fortune 500 companies, escalating healthcare fraud costs, and widespread use of corrupt payments to facilitate
overseas expansion. 99 As a result, both state and federal law, as well as sector-specific self-regulatory bodies, developed
internal control regimes to monitor risks to the firm's financial profile as well as compliance with applicable law.
a. Federal Law
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 regulates the systems a public company employs to collect, process, and disclose
financial information to satisfy its statutory reporting requirements. 100 Corporate and accounting frauds like those in
Enron, GlobalCrossing, and WorldCom demonstrated the inadequacy of internal controls with regard to accounting
practices. 101 Under Sarbanes-Oxley, auditors must “test” the scope of a company's internal control procedures
and present its findings in its annual audit report. 102 The audit report must include an evaluation of whether the
*286 internal controls provide both a system of maintaining records that fairly and accurately reflect the company's
transactions, and a reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded in accordance with the preparation of GAAP
financial statements. 103 The audit report must also contain a description of any material weaknesses in the internal
controls and any material noncompliance. 104
The Act requires the CEO and CFO to certify, in each annual and quarterly report issued by the company, as to a number
of subjects, including internal controls. 105 They must certify that they are responsible for establishing and maintaining
internal controls; have designed the internal controls to enable them to obtain all material financial information; have
evaluated the effectiveness of the internal controls; and have presented their conclusions about the effectiveness of the
internal controls in the report. 106 The CEO and CFO must also certify that they have disclosed to the company's
auditors and the audit committee of the board of directors all significant deficiencies in the internal controls that could
adversely affect the company's ability to maintain and report financial data, and have identified for the auditors any
material weaknesses in internal controls. 107 They must also disclose any fraud, whether material or not, that involves
management or other employees that have a significant role in the company's internal controls.
The certification must also state that the CEO and CFO have indicated in the report any significant changes in internal
controls or changes in other factors affecting them after the date they were evaluated, including any corrective actions
taken to remedy deficiencies and weaknesses. 108 Aside from federal law, stock exchanges impose their own disclosure
and internal *287 governance requirements that aim to create and channel relevant information to investors. 109
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b. State Law
In 1996, Delaware Chancellor William Allen entered a consent decree approving a settlement between shareholders of
CVS/Caremark and the corporation's board of directors based in part on allegations that the directors had breached
their duty of care by failing to have in place systems that would effectively prevent illegal kickback arrangements
between physicians and CVS/Caremark affiliated pharmaceutical and provider companies. 110 While the chancellor's
consent decree nudged Delaware law toward greater board responsibility for monitoring financial and legal risks to
the corporation (under Graham v. Allis-Chalmers, the board was liable only if it “recklessly reposed confidence in
an obviously untrustworthy employee . . . or ignored either willfully or through inattention obvious danger signs of
employee wrongdoing”), the episode itself shows how little the state law duty affects corporate behavior. Even though
the chancellor found CVS/Caremark's system of compliance and ethics training more than adequate to cover a potential
breach of fiduciary duty, that system had failed to uncover or manage the illegal arrangements. The Delaware Supreme
Court adopted the chancellor's analysis in Stone v. Ritter, another case where a corporation's extensive compliance system
(there, a bank's compliance with suspicious activity reporting requirements) failed to prevent shareholder losses. 111
Nevertheless, directors are under duties imposed by state corporation law to implement internal control policies as part
of their duty of care.
II. THE STRUCTURE AND PURPOSE OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
As the aforementioned discussion shows, firms of all kinds are under obligations imposed by state and federal law as
well as private authorities *288 like stock exchanges to generate and effectively structure the flow of information to
protect many constituencies including consumers, employees, and investors. Similarly, the law imposes obligations to
protect taxpayers. Like other purchasers of products or securities, the federal government procures massive amounts
of goods and services from the private sector to undertake both routine and critical functions including provision of
healthcare, national defense, environmental protection, and even promotion of the United States Postal Service. 112 In
addition, of course, to common law fraud claims, the False Claims Act is the statute the federal government uses to
ensure that the corporations (and individuals) from which it purchases goods and services do not perpetrate fraud or
jeopardize the integrity of federal programs. Thirty-two states maintain similar statutes for which Congress provided a
recovery-based incentive in 2006. 113
Under the False Claims Act regime, originally a Civil War-era statute aimed at preventing fraud against the Union Army,
private citizens (“whistleblowers” or “relators”) work closely with the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) to identify
inappropriate claims submitted to the government for payment. 114 In an archetypal case, an employee who witnesses
or participates in a fraudulent scheme uses that information as the basis for a lawsuit against the employer on the
government's behalf. 115 The statute *289 allows whistleblowers to share up to 30 percent of the United States's ultimate
recovery. 116 While the complaint is under seal, and before it is served on the defendant, DOJ investigates to decide
whether to intervene and take over the prosecution of the action or decline to intervene and allow the whistleblower
to proceed alone. 117 The False Claims Act establishes liability for any person who knowingly presents, or causes
to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval. 118 A defendant may be liable if a claim for
reimbursement is factually or legally false, 119 and, if defendant has “actual knowledge” of the falsity of the claim, or if
the defendant acts with “deliberate ignorance,” or “reckless disregard” as to the veracity of the claim. 120 A factually false
claim is rendered not payable because it rests on inaccurate factual information about the product or service billed. 121
Legally false claims are those for which the goods or services are as designated in the agreement with the government,
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but the claim violates a legal condition of payment for the product being billed. 122 Where it establishes liability, the
government is entitled to treble damages per claim under the statute. 123
*290 The statute is “one of the most successful tools for combating waste and abuse in government spending.” 124 In
2013 alone, there were over 700 lawsuits brought under the False Claims Act and total monetary recovery exceeding $3.8
billion in addition to less quantifiable recoveries in terms of settlement provisions regulating corporate behavior. 125
A. The Textual and Legislative History Behind the False Claims Act's Knowledge Provisions
The provisions of the statute relevant for ascertaining “knowledge” read:
(a) Liability for Certain Acts.--

(1) In general.--Subject to paragraph (2), any person who--

(A) knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval;

(B) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false or statement material to a false or fraudulent
claim;

(C) conspires to commit a violation of subparagraph (A), (B), (D), (E), (F), or (G);

(D) has possession, custody, or control of property or money used, or to be used, by the Government and
knowingly delivers, or causes to be delivered, less than all of that money or property;

(E) is authorized to make or deliver a document certifying receipt of property used, or to be used, by the
Government and, intending to defraud the Government, makes or delivers the receipt without completely
knowing that the information on the receipt is true;

*291 (F) knowingly buys, or receives as a pledge of an obligation or debt, public property from an officer
or employee of the Government, or a member of the Armed Forces, who lawfully may not sell or pledge
property; or
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(G) knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to
an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or
knowingly and improperly avoids or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the
Government, 126

For purposes of defining “knowing” and “knowingly”:

(b) Definitions . . .

(1) the terms “knowing” and “knowingly”--

(A) mean that a person, with respect to information--

(i) has actual knowledge of the information;

(ii) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information; or

(iii) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information; and

(B) require no proof of specific intent to defraud; 127

The False Claims Act is notorious for generating disagreements between federal courts over virtually every word in
the statute and the factors that determine whether a corporation “knowingly” submitted a false claim are similarly
opaque. 128 The principal reason for this is not inattention or thoughtlessness in Congressional drafting committees
but rather the difficulty of tailoring language in the statute to the diverse and numerous *292 forms in which claims
for payment from the government are made. 129 “Person” under the statute “include[s] corporations, companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.” 130 While there has been
little analysis of the issue, it is almost certainly the case that it is a relevant inquiry as to who the “person” is in False
Claims Act litigation. In SAIC v. U.S., in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected a
collective corporate instruction, the panel did so because:
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even absent proof that corporate officials acted with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard for the truth
by submitting a false claim as the result of, for instance, a communication failure, the fact-finder could
determine that the corporation knowingly submitted a false claim. 131

In other words, the government must be able to prove that at least one employee or corporate official had requisite
knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or reckless disregard to prevail. 132
But imposing such a requirement narrows the definition of “person” found in 1 U.S. Code § 1: “the words ‘person’ and
‘whoever’ include corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as
well as individuals[.]” 133 Under their reading, the False Claims Act would only apply to individuals, except where that
individual were acting as an agent of a corporation or other business entity. The legislative history shows that Congress
demonstrated a more sophisticated view of the law (and of corporations) than that, and intended duties imposed by the
law to strengthen as the size and sophistication of the party submitting claims increased.
Indeed, where an individual or small business submits a false claim, that falsity is salient and often straightforward. In
U.S. v. Lorenzo, for example, the defendant dentist was found to have repeatedly ignored warnings that the Medicare
claims his company submitted for oral cancer screenings were *293 false. 134 In several instances, the defendant was
warned by his employees that the claims they submitted were likely not covered by Medicare. 135 At least once, the
Medical Director of a group of nursing homes that the defendant serviced challenged the defendant's right to submit
Medicare reimbursement claims for the work the defendant performed. 136 Finally, one of the defendant's carriers
consistently refused to provide reimbursement for the healthcare service the defendant billed for. 137
The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania held that this evidence was sufficient to find that the
defendant had ignored repeated warnings and “red flags” about the potential falsity of his reimbursement claims and
thus had not met his duty to conduct a “reasonable and prudent” inquiry given the apparent possibility that the claims
were false. 138 The Lorenzo case suggests that small providers are fairly easily assessed as having ignored “red flags,” or
failed to undertake a reasonable investigation. 139
Yet even in the small provider context, it is easy to see how lax or inattentive management can lead to profitable, if
false, billing. In U.S. v. Krizek, the defendant operated a small psychiatric practice. 140 The defendant's billing staff
approximated the length of the psychotherapy sessions provided to patients. 141 Despite sessions that ran anywhere from
20 minutes to over an hour, the billing staff adopted a 50-minute session as the standard billable time. 142 The staff never
checked with the doctor to determine the actual amount of time he spent treating patients. 143 These approximations
resulted in obvious over-billings, such as, in several instances, billing for more than 20 hours' worth of work in a 24hour period. 144 The defendant argued that the small, non-corporate nature of his *294 practice should mitigate his
culpability to mere negligence. 145 However, the D.C. District Court disagreed, finding the defendant liable based on
the woeful inadequacy of his billing system and his failure to perform even limited supervision of the billing staff. 146
The court stated that, “These were not ‘mistakes' nor merely negligent conduct . . . . [T]he defendants acted with reckless
disregard as to the truth or falsity of the submissions.” 147
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While in small provider or contractor cases the requisite level of “knowledge” has been relatively easy to ascertain, the
government has tended to procure the largest amount of goods and services through larger business entities and it is
cases involving larger firms that have traditionally vexed courts' application of the statute. Before 1986, the False Claims
Act imposed liability where a defendant had “actual or constructive knowledge that the claim was false . . . .” 148 The
constructive knowledge standard was intended to broaden the Act's scope to include persons who sought payment from
the government “without regard to . . . eligibility and with indifference for the requirements of eligibility . . . .” 149 It was
instead largely read by federal appellate courts to impose a higher scienter standard than Congress intended. 150
Congress revisited the False Claims Act in 1986 precisely because fraud against the government had reached alarming
levels, draining 1-10% of the entire federal budget. 151 Over the course of the 1970s, federal appellate courts had limited
the False Claims Act's reach by requiring heightened burdens of proof, constraining damages theories, and excluding
claims against Medicaid (as the claims were technically submitted to state, not federal, officials). 152 Attributing the
courts' restrictive reading of the scienter requirement to the ambiguity of “constructive knowledge”, Congress replaced
the phrase with “deliberate ignorance” and “reckless *295 disregard” to reach conduct greater than “mere negligence
but less than specific intent.” 153 Throughout the legislative history, both the House of Representatives and the Senate
displayed a heightened sensitivity to the realities of corporate structures that channeled relevant information - especially
about legal compliance - away from firm decision-makers. In a 1986 Report, Senator Strom Thurmond noted the
hobbling effect of judicial interpretations:
Currently, in judicial districts observing an “actual knowledge” standard, the Government is unable to
hold responsible those corporate officers who insulate themselves from knowledge of false claims submitted
by lower-level subordinates. This “ostrich-like” conduct which can occur in large corporations poses
insurmountable difficulties for civil false claims recoveries. 154

While the Report somewhat inartfully referred to a “duty to make a limited inquiry,” 155 the accompanying discussion
made clear that the “duty” imposed should be tailored to the size and sophistication of the party receiving government
funds. 156 An earlier version of the amendments included a duty to investigate that would be “reasonable and prudent
to conduct under the circumstances to ascertain the true and accurate basis of the claim or statement.” 157 The Senate
Governmental Affairs Committee *296 made clear that, whatever nuances and distinctions might be made for corporate
executives' personal liability, “the corporation would be held responsible for the collective knowledge of its employees
under the doctrine of respondeat superior.” 158 In hearings, Senator Bill Cohen not only noted the importance of the
False Claims Act to apply to fraud in the defense contracting context where it was prevalent, he specifically cited the
check-kiting scandal at the financial institution E.F. Hutton as a situation:
[W]here the top executive said, “we didn't know that that was going on. We didn't know that all that money
was being floated out there on these checks. We had no knowledge.” And do you say, wait 1 minute. Do
the top executives have a higher obligation? Did they have reason to know? Do they have knowledge or
should there have been knowledge? That's the tough issue we're getting at here and it seems to me, in view
of the amount of false or fictitious claims that have been, I think, perpetrated against the Government and
not prosecuted, that there should be some shifting of the burden there. 159
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Congressional sensitivity to the structure of information channels in corporations and other large organizations was
echoed in the testimony of Executive Branch officials. HHS Inspector General Richard Kusserow summarized the
False Claims Act's ambit in a 1982 assessment prepared for Congress when he wrote “[a]s to the liability of an
organization, e.g. corporation, etc., it is usually the combined knowledge of the employees which is attributed to the
organization . . . .” 160 Assistant Attorney General Richard K. Willard testified before the Subcommittee on Oversight
of Government Management that:
[G]iven the realities of modern corporate structures, responsible officials may arrange deliberately to shield
themselves from knowledge or will be reckless in their submission of claims to the Government. We simply
have *297 to have a standard that is broader than actual knowledge in order to deal with the realities of
the modern contracting process. 161

As it applied to healthcare false claims specifically, the Executive's position on the duty to assure accurate claims was
eventually codified into a memorandum to all US Attorney's Offices detailing guidelines for the prosecution of healthcare
fraud. 162
Although Congress understood the possibility of benign mistakes where complex agreements governed claims, 163
it specifically designated complex corporate structures as a principal threat to the integrity of federal procurement
programs. 164 The amendment's chief sponsor in the House, Representative Howard Berman, articulated several broad
instances where a federal contractor may be found to have breached its duty to investigate. 165 Congressman Berman
stated that, “Contractors who ignore or fail to inquire about red flags that should alert them to the fact that false
claims are being submitted will be liable for those false claims.” 166 Berman also stated that, contractors who prepare
reimbursement claims in a “sloppy or unsupervised fashion” should be held liable for violating the FCA. 167 The drafting
committee's refusal to express a rigid definition of the duty that they intended to impose on government contractors
was not driven by indifference to collective corporate knowledge, but rather the nearly countless circumstances under
which parties submitted claims for payment to the government made it “impossible” to articulate the duty in the statute
itself. 168
The 2009 Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, passed largely to address fraudulent behavior in the housing market
that affected federally regulated and federally insured programs, included amendments to the False Claims Act to expand
the reach of corporate agents that submitted *298 false claims or caused those claims to be submitted. 169 In 2008,
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the False Claims Act only reached general contractors, or the party actually
presenting the claim to the government, not subcontractors or other parties who intended only to defraud the principal
entity submitting claims to the government. 170 FERA overturned the decision, making clear that any party, even if it
submitted a claim to an entirely private party, may be subject to False Claims Act liability. 171 In other words, Congress
stretched outside the typical boundaries of the firm, so that even parties with whom primary claims submitters contracted
were potentially liable for False Claims Act violations.
The Affordable Care Act and Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act similarly expanded the types of conduct for
which False Claims Act liability would attach, implemented new protections for whistleblowers, and widened FERA's
definition of acts protected by the retaliation cause of action. 172 Despite the numerous sources of law that require
corporations to effectively aggregate their employees' knowledge as well as the text and legislative history behind the
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federal False Claims Act, federal courts have divided on the issue of whether a collective corporate knowledge doctrine
is appropriate to determine liability under the law.
B. Collective Corporate Knowledge in the Federal Courts
The use of certain species of collective corporate knowledge doctrines has a long history in the federal courts in both the
civil and criminal contexts. 173 In U.S. v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., a federal district court imputed *299 the knowledge of
dispatchers at a trucking company, who were aware of several drivers' reports of illness, to the corporation for purposes
of assessing compliance with the Interstate Commerce Act. 174 T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., a motor carrier under federal law,
maintained an unexcused absence policy under which, for calling in sick or injured, a letter would issue marking the
absence as “unexcused.” 175 Upon receipt of medical verification, the company would issue a second, “nullifying”
letter. 176 The company posted no notice of the policy, relying on the “word-of-mouth” of its dispatchers, many of whom
did not convey all aspects of the policy. 177 The effect was for impaired drivers to call in to dispatchers, be instructed
as to the adverse employment action without being informed of the medical verification “exculpation” provision, and
then drive while ill or injured. 178 The corporate defendant raised as a defense that it could not have knowingly and
willingly violated federal motor carrier regulations because no manager knew impaired drivers were operating motor
carriers. 179 The court rejected the defense determining that “a corporation cannot plead innocence by asserting that
the information obtained by several employees was not acquired by any one individual employee who then would have
comprehended its full import.” 180 Under the court's ruling, the government was allowed to meet its evidentiary burden
by showing that (1) dispatchers knew of impaired drivers and (2) separate firm managers knew federal law prohibited
drivers so impaired from operating motor carriers. 181
U.S. v. Bank of New England is considered the seminal case addressing collective knowledge. 182 There, the First Circuit
upheld a collective knowledge instruction in a prosecution under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting
Act, 183 allowing the jury to combine the separate *300 knowledge of bank employees who only knew about a client's
large transactions and other employees who only knew about regulations requiring the transactions to be reported. 184
The appellate court upheld the trial court's jury instruction that the Bank's “. . . knowledge is the sum of the knowledge of
all of the employees. That is, the bank's knowledge is the totality of what all the employees know within the scope of their
employment.” 185 The court concluded “[t]he aggregate of those components constitutes the corporation's knowledge
of a particular operation. It is irrelevant whether employees administering one component of an operation know the
specific activities of employees administering another aspect of the operation. . . .” 186 The court clarified that even
if separate employees only knew different parts of the reporting requirement, and never communicated their separate
knowledge to each other, the bank was still deemed to know that the requirement existed. 187 “Since the Bank had the
compartmentalized structure common to all large corporations, the court's collective knowledge instruction [is] not only
proper but necessary.” 188
After the First Circuit's decision in Bank of New England, several district courts permitted jury instructions allowing
the use of the collective knowledge doctrine. 189 A D.C. District Court instructed a jury in a False Claims Act case
specifically, 190 noting that it was proper since it had previously been applied in both the criminal and the civil
contexts. 191 In United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., the district court found that the use of the collective corporate
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knowledge doctrine was appropriate in the civil RICO context, relying heavily on Bank of New England and tenets of
agency law. 192
*301 1. Corporate Collective Knowledge Is a Logical Extension of Statutory Purpose and Agency Principles
In False Claims Act jurisprudence, collective corporate knowledge doctrines have been used relatively infrequently and
their reception by federal appellate courts has been mixed. On one end of the spectrum, federal courts have determined
that the legislative history as well as agency principles weigh in favor of the application of a collective corporate
knowledge approach in False Claims Act cases. In UMC Electronics v. United States, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims
referred to Berman's statements on the House floor as part of its support that “at a minimum, every party filing a claim
before the contracting officer . . . has a duty to examine its records to determine what amounts the government already
has paid or whether payments are actually owed to subcontractors or vendors.” 193 The court held that disavowing such
a duty among government contractors would open the door to fraudulent billing. 194
In Miller v. Holzmann, a case involving fraud in the award and execution of public works projects in Egypt, the D.C.
District Court instructed the jury that “corporations are liable for the collective knowledge of all employees and agents
within the corporation so long as those individuals obtained their knowledge acting on behalf of the corporation.” 195
The D.C. Circuit affirmed, noting that “under basic principles of agency law, corporate defendants are charged with
constructive knowledge of all material facts that their agents and officers learn in the scope of their employment.” 196
While its order is less clear, the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, on a False Claims Act counterclaim, rejected the
plaintiff's attempt to persuade the court to “follow several non-precedential opinions by other courts, holding that it
is inappropriate to aggregate ‘collective corporate knowledge’ to satisfy the ‘knowledge’ element of the False Claims
Act.” 197 In that case, a government contractor argued that it could avoid False Claims Act liability because the person
submitting claims for reimbursement from the government did not know *302 that the amounts included illegal rebates
for one of the contractor's subsidiaries. 198
2. Collective Corporate Knowledge Is a Plausible (but Unnecessary) Theory
Other courts have accepted the possibility of using a collective corporate knowledge theory to analyze the statute's
scienter requirement, but have found it inapplicable or unnecessary to do so. 199 In United States v. United Technologies
Corp., the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut reviewed the arguments for and against application of the
collective corporate knowledge doctrine in a defense contracting context, but ultimately determined that “the facts of [the]
case [do not] warrant the use of the collective corporate knowledge doctrine to impute knowledge to [[Defendant].” 200
That court treated the legislative history's vocabulary of “mere negligence” or “mistake” as something like an affirmative
defense: “[Defendant] has succeeded in establishing that the facts of this case show that [its] actions were merely negligent,
inadvertent or a mistake. . . .” 201
In United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., the Fourth Circuit found that application of the
collective knowledge doctrine was unnecessary, because one firm agent or employee did in fact have requisite knowledge
although it left open the possibility of adopting the doctrine later. 202 In that case, the defendant corporation was found
to have falsely attested to the Department of Energy that it did not have any organizational conflicts of interest that
would interfere with the defendant's performance of a government contract. 203 On appeal, the defendant argued for
the adoption of a “single actor” standard, whereby scienter could only be proven if a single corporate officer or agent
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possessed all the requisite knowledge. 204 The court held that adopting the “single actor” standard would incentivize
corporations to create offices isolated from the rest of the *303 corporate structure whose only purpose was to certify
government contracts in effect shielding them from ever amalgamating the knowledge that might, in a False Claims Act
action, be found to prove scienter. 205
In the retaliation context, the Seventh Circuit rejected a relator's claim that he was terminated for identifying potential
false claims because he could not show that his immediate supervisors ran red flags up to corporate decision-makers. 206
The court refused to impute the supervisors' knowledge to the corporation concluding that “the law is clear that it is
the decision-makers' knowledge that is crucial . . . companies are not liable under the False Claims Act for every scrap
of information that someone in or outside the chain of responsibility might have” but conceded certain exceptions that
might result in the application of a collective knowledge doctrine. 207
3. Collective Corporate Knowledge Is Inconsistent With the False Claims Act's Language, Structure and Purpose
At the other end of the spectrum, the D.C. Circuit rejected the use of the collective knowledge doctrine in United States
v. Science Applications International Corp. 208 The defendant, a 14,000-employee large projects firm, was found to have
violated the False Claims Act by submitting claims for payment on a consulting contract that attested the defendant
was not advising other firms in the same field, when in fact it was. 209 The purpose of the attestation was to insure that
conflicts-of-interest did not interfere with the development of appropriate guidelines to dispose of radioactive waste for
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 210 SAIC was advising both the NRC and two firms, British Nuclear Fuels, Ltd.
and the Bechtel Jacobs Company, both of which undertook business activities that might be substantially affected by
the regulations the NRC was promulgating. 211 After the NRC discovered the conflict, the U.S. Department of Justice
brought a False Claims Act suit because SAIC had sought claim for *304 payment that violated the conflict-of-interest
terms of its engagement. 212 The trial court instructed the jury that it could find the defendant liable both through “actual
knowledge” and by using the collective knowledge doctrine. 213
SAIC argued that in order for the government to prove knowledge under the False Claims Act, it would have to
demonstrate “that the defendant knew its claims or statements were false, not merely that the defendant knew underlying
facts that were later assembled by the government to construct an allegedly false claim.” 214 Although the D.C. Circuit
conceded that more than one employee at SAIC knew about the NRC's conflicts-of-interest policy and the materiality of
that policy for payment of claims, the court nevertheless determined that the collective corporate knowledge instruction
might be more than harmless error:
even though the jury might well have accepted SAIC's arguments that its compliance system was generally
adequate and that individual employees with knowledge of the company's conflicting business relationships
honestly and reasonably believed that these relationships created no potential conflicts, it still might have
concluded based on the company's “collective knowledge” that SAIC knew about the conflicts. 215

The SAIC court determined that the use of the collective knowledge was inappropriate because it was inconsistent
with what the court interpreted to be the FCA's language, structure, and purpose. 216 The court reasoned that this was
inappropriate not only because it allowed the fact-finder to elevate negligence to fraud, but that in doing so the defendant
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could be liable for treble damages; something that it would not otherwise be liable for in a regular negligence or breach
of contract action. 217
The D.C. Circuit conceded that False Claims Act liability attaches where a corporate defendant structures itself so as to
avoid an amalgamation of the information necessary to prove that a false claim was *305 knowingly submitted. 218 The
court cited the Senate Committee Reports from the 1986 amendments taking aim at corporate compartmentalization 219
but nevertheless concluded that a collective corporate knowledge instruction risked False Claims Act liability for
negligent or even honest mistakes inconsistently with the statute's legislative history. 220
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania adopted the D.C. Circuit's reasoning in United States
v. Educational Management Corporation, at least insofar as it rejected a per se collective corporate knowledge theory. 221
The district court determined that although the False Claims Act intended “to capture the ostrich-like conduct which
can occur in large corporations where corporate officers insulate themselves from knowledge of false claims submitted
by lower-level subordinates” it was not necessary since plaintiffs had adequately alleged scienter on the part of top
managers. 222
In United States v. Fadul, the government brought a False Claims Act suit against a doctor who owned a medical
practice allegedly submitting fraudulent Medicare and Medicaid reimbursement claims. 223 The defendant was alleged
to have knowingly operated a billing system that regularly generated two bills for one medical treatment. 224 The
government's complaint further alleged that the defendant had been approached by his billing staff on several occasions
with concerns about the operation of the billing system but that the defendant instructed the billing staff to continue
billing as they had been. 225 In the government's motion for summary judgment, it argued first that actual knowledge
was present, but in the alternative it argued that collective knowledge would suffice to show scienter. 226 The district
court rejected the government's attempt to prove scienter through collective knowledge. 227 Although the court followed
the *306 Harrison holding where the corporate officer who has knowledge of the falsity need not also be the officer who
submitted the claim, the Fadul court cited the D.C. Circuit Court's holding in SAIC in rejecting collective knowledge as
an appropriate basis for scienter. 228 The Fadul court concluded: “When the Government seeks to hold an entity liable
under the False Claims Act, it cannot rely on the collective knowledge of the entity's agents to establish scienter. . . .
Instead, the Government must prove an entity's scienter by demonstrating that a particular employee or officer acted
knowingly.” 229
C. Solving the Collective Corporate Knowledge Disagreement through Burden Shifting: Mere Negligence or Mistake as
Affirmative Defenses
The D.C. Circuit's conclusion in SAIC is in tension with the legislative history and statutory purpose behind the False
Claims Act, especially when read in light of amendments passed under the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act, DoddFrank, and the Affordable Care Act, all of which were preoccupied at least in large part with the threat large complex
business structures posed to federal programs or federally insured programs. While it is true that Congress did not
intend to ensnare firms that committed honest mistakes or “mere negligence”, the broader history suggests that for
large business organizations or complex government contracting schemes, the duty to investigate the veracity of claims
would grow correspondingly heavier. The effect of the D.C. Circuit's analysis is precisely the opposite of what Congress
intended: instead of allowing the size of the firm to influence its duty to investigate, the decision effectively allows firms
to use their large size and/or complexity to evade liability. Indeed, the decision closely tracks the views expressed by the
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National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) in an amicus curiae brief supporting SAIC. 230 NDIA argued that the
collective knowledge doctrine was both impractical and inappropriate in light of modern corporate structure. 231 NDIA
stressed the problem of developing an infallible method of fusing “disparate pieces of *307 knowledge - particularly in
a company with tens of thousands of employees and dozens of offices spread across the globe.” 232
No court has explicitly tailored a False Claims Act defendant's duty to investigate the veracity of claims to the size
and sophistication of the submitting party as Congress envisioned. To some extent this may reflect courts' hesitance to
attempt to draw lines between large and small firms or they may simply be relying on the Department of Justice and US
Attorneys' offices to filter their cases based on the strength of evidence regardless of entity size or sophistication.
What courts have done as an approximate proxy for entity size is to construct a series of affirmative defenses available
to False Claims Act defendants who invoke a given reimbursement scheme's complexity. 233 For example, in United
States ex rel. Hagood v. Sonoma County Water Agency, the defendant was accused of submitting a contract that used
an impermissible method to perform its cost analysis. 234 The defendant claimed that its use of an improper cost
calculation method did not fall within the statutory definition of “knowingly,” because the defendant believed its method
was legal. 235 Although the Ninth Circuit determined that the defendant's position was an issue for the fact-finder, it
concluded that, “[t]o take advantage of a disputed legal question, as may have happened here, is to be neither deliberately
ignorant nor recklessly disregardful.” 236 In Tyger Const. Co. Inc. v. United States, in a situation factually similar to
Hagood, the Court of Federal Claims held that “[a]ttaching . . . FCA liability to expressions of legal opinion would have
an impermissibly stifling effect on the legitimate presentation of claims.” 237
Similar to the defense of mistaken legal theory, it is possible, although untested, that a defendant may exculpate itself
by arguing that it lacked appropriate guidance on how to properly submit a reimbursement claim or that the guidelines
governing the claim were ambiguous. 238 In United States v. Krizek, the government contended that the billing code the
defendant *308 used covered only time spent working directly with the patient, not time outside the patient's presence
working on his or her case. 239 The court held that the government's contention was not supported by the actual language
of the code, and that doctors should, “be given clear guidance as to what services are reimbursable.” 240
Although implicit in the district court's decision in United States v. United Technologies Corp., the burden-shifting
approach to collective corporate knowledge cases effectively advance Congress's interest in holding large business
organizations to a higher duty to investigate the veracity of claims while ensuring an adequate defense to genuine
instances of mistake by government contractors. The government, of course, does not pursue collective corporate
knowledge theories in every False Claims Act case. Indeed, such a theory is unnecessary when there is evidence of actual
knowledge on the part of corporate decision-makers. By allowing the government to introduce a theory of collective
corporate knowledge but allowing defendants an affirmative defense of mistake or mere negligence, the statutory scheme
envisioned by Congress would be better respected than rejecting the theory outright.
It is also true that after a False Claims Act complaint is unsealed, law firms representing large firm defendants will
assert their representation over current and former employees. 241 The principal purpose of that assertion (often made
without having even contacted the employee in question) is to prevent government attorneys from interviewing the former
employee without the primary defendant's knowledge. 242 The implication for purposes of the collective corporate
knowledge doctrine, however, is clear: a defendant cannot have it both ways. Either the attorneys for the defendant
*309 represent current and former employees (and thus are responsible for their collective knowledge) or they are not.
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III. THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND THE FINANCIAL INTEGRITY OF THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
While challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act have focused on core mechanisms like compelled
participation in the insurance pool and the availability of subsidies for those purchasing insurance from federal
exchanges, Congress was just as aware that healthcare fraud accompanying increased utilization, both from criminal
activity and from large providers skirting rules on submitting appropriate claims. In 2008, the FBI arrested doctors
and patients who submitted over 140,000 false claims for pretending to receive expensive HIV-drug treatments. 243
On October 13, 2010, federal and state law enforcement officials indicted 44 individuals for billing Medicare for over
$100 million for “services” that were never provided at phantom clinics. 244 One pharmacist bilked Medicaid for over
$1.8 million in less than a year by submitting phony claims for prescriptions that he never filled. 245 Yet not all of the
improprieties are committed by easily identifiable perpetrators. Because Medicaid and Medicare “pay and chase” - that
is, reimburse claims as a matter of course and then pursue improper billing later - millions are also lost for services,
drugs, or supplies that are unnecessary, not performed, or are of a lower quality or more costly than those that are
actually administered or provided. 246 “Major corporations such as pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers
and institutions such as hospitals and nursing facilities have also committed fraud, sometimes on a grand scale.” 247
Physicians may refer patients to *310 providers with whom they share a financial interest and create incentives to raise
costs or pay kick-backs, but Congress has curtailed such practices with the Anti-Kickback Statute and Stark Law. 248 In
addition, providers benefit from what appear to be even benign mistakes. For example, charging a patient for an “office
visit” when he or she only visited for a flu shot, is a tactic known as “upcoding” that results in a higher reimbursement
for the health care provider. 249
Moreover, insurance offered by private third party payers through state and federal exchanges has been interpreted
under the Obama Administration as exempt from relevant fraud prevention laws. 250 This interpretation, however, is
likely to change as the affordability of the law comes under additional pressure. 251 For example, if it comes clear that
insurers are accepting subsidies from the federal government in exchange for “phantom” enrollees, that interpretation
of the law is likely to change. 252
Prior to the passage of the Affordable Care Act, the General Accounting Office issued regular reports which indicated
that CMS could not keep pace with enforcement demands. On June 28, 2005, the GAO reported that CMS had only 8
employees devoted to chasing down improper Medicaid billing. 253 On March 3, 2010, the GAO reported that between
2005 and 2008, CMS had failed to ensure that Medicare Part D drug plan providers *311 had implemented policies
to prevent and catch fraud and waste. 254 The same month, GAO reported that even where CMS or its agents had
identified weaknesses in provider billing processes, CMS failed to act on its recommendations. 255 The GAO reports
focus generally on the universe of command-and-control and performance standards regulations that are in place but
have not been implemented because the HHS OIG or CMS are unable - by virtue of resource scarcity - to coordinate or
enforce. With the passage of the Affordable Care Act, Congress increased the budget for HHS's oversight activities by
approximately $35 million per year for ten years and mandated the development of better screening and data-sharing
processes. 256
A. Fraud Prevention and Enforcement and Healthcare Entitlements
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Despite the contentious, partisan disagreement over the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, one basic principle
that commentators across the political spectrum agreed upon was the urgent need to address pervasive fraud in
government funded health care programs. 257 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) estimated that
the United States spent $2.4 trillion on health care in 2008, with a projected 5.8% per annum increase through 2022. 258
One Government Accountability Office (GAO) report noted that from 1970 until 2009 health care spending in the federal
*312 budget increased from approximately 8.3 to 26.9 percent. 259 In real dollars “Medicare spending, which represents
a large share of federal health care expenditures, is projected to increase from approximately $519 billion in 2010 to
approximately $922 billion in 2020.” 260
Government watchdogs have long known that Medicare and Medicaid are particularly susceptible to fraud, waste, abuse,
and improper payments. The GAO has designated both Medicare and Medicaid as “high-risk” government spending
programs. 261 The National Health Care Anti-Fraud Association (NHCAA) recently estimated that losses due to fraud
accounted for at least 3% of all federal health care spending. 262 The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) places the
estimated losses even higher, having assessed that 10% of all federal health care spending was in response to fraudulent
claims. 263 In 2009 dollars, those estimates represented between $70 billion and $234 billion respectively. 264 The GAO
reported that hospitals alone accounted for “nearly 20 percent of the 2,339 subjects of civil fraud cases investigated in
2010.” 265
In spite of conservative opposition to the passage of the ACA, the focus on health care fraud afforded an opportunity
for bipartisanship. The legislative history is replete with both liberal and conservative commentators decrying the levels
of fraud and waste within health care *313 systems. 266 In floor debates from November through December 2009
Democratic Senators Max Baucus and Patrick Leahy were vocal advocates for the potential of the ACA's anti-fraud
provisions to reduce future false claims. 267 Conservatives, like Senators Mike Enzi and Tom Coburn argued, not that
the ACA would increase fraud, but that the ACA's anti-fraud provisions did not go far enough. 268 In testimony on the
Senate floor, Senator Coburn argued that $125 billion dollars a year was lost to “fraud, waste, and abuse” in Medicare/
Medicaid. 269
While the Affordable Care Act adopted specific measures aimed at the financial risk posed by fraud, those measures
largely targeted new providers and those undertaking criminal, sensational, but often less impactful healthcare fraud. The
Obama Administration established the Health Care Fraud Prevention and Enforcement Action Team (HEAT), a cabinet
level task force designed to reduce fraud. 270 The ACA's anti-fraud provisions introduced the use of “sophisticated
information-technology platforms, comprehensive data mining, and increased financial and human resources.” 271 The
GAO said as much in a 2012 report: “Although targeting certain types of providers that CMS has identified as high risk
may be useful, it may allow other types of providers committing fraud to go unnoticed.”
Together, hospital care, physician and clinical services, and prescription drugs account for approximately 62% of
the nation's healthcare expenditures. 272 The healthcare sectors described below represent key vulnerabilities for the
submission of false claims related to these sectors.
*314 1. Hospitals
Hospitals represent a key source of false claims because of the multiple ways in which claims may be coded, conditions of
payment, and conditions of participation imposed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and state agencies,

© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

22

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

COLLECTIVE CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE AND THE..., 68 Baylor L. Rev. 265

and the large, complex bureaucracy overseeing those processes. 273 Indeed, not only are hospital systems consolidating
and becoming larger and more complex, they are adding physicians as direct employees. 274 The latter trend provides a
larger incentive for hospitals to compensate physicians according to the value of their referrals, a practice that is not only
illegal but raises the costs of care generally. 275 Hospitals have been found to pay doctors above fair market value and in
ways that were not commercially reasonable unless the value of the doctors' referrals was taken into consideration. 276
As healthcare providers become larger and more complex, a collective corporate knowledge theory of liability will be
necessary to effectively regulate that size and complexity.
In 2015, for example, nearly 500 hospitals nationwide paid more than $250 million for implanting heart defibrillators
in post-surgical patients whose recoveries may have avoided the necessity of such a device. 277 The implication was that
hospitals were violating standards of clinical care in order to receive the reimbursements Medicare and Medicaid paid
for the implantations. 278 Hospitals have also been found to double-bill federal reimbursement programs by charging
for services provided as part of inpatient care, but also by seeking reimbursement for the same person when *315 he or
she becomes an outpatient case. 279 A similar scheme allowed hospitals to charge federal reimbursement programs for
individual lab tests on a single sample, even when all necessary results could be obtained from a single test. 280 “Because
the Medicare program involves millions of claims submitted by thousands of providers, the cumulative effect of even
small overpayments can involve billions of dollars in . . . losses.” 281
2. Pharmaceuticals
Prescription drugs account for between 9-10% of all health spending and pharmaceutical firms have long engaged in
practices that raise the cost of drugs. 282 When contracting with the government directly, for example, for bulk purchases
by the Veterans' Administration, pharmaceutical firms have made explicit promises as to favorable pricing that they have
later violated. 283 Pharmaceutical firms have paid direct and indirect inducements to physicians and other providers to
both prescribe more expensive medications as well as to prescribe medications “off-label” or for conditions other than
those approved by the Food and Drug Administration. 284 Indeed, pharmaceutical firms have paid billions of dollars
in settlements under the False Claims Act for inducements and off-label marketing of pharmaceuticals that raise prices
for Medicare, Medicaid, and the Veterans' Administration. 285
*316 Relatedly, pharmaceutical firms found guilty of these practices are also large and complex. 286 Pfizer, the world's
second largest pharmaceutical firm, employs nearly 80,000 people across multiple divisions. 287 Merck has nearly 70,000
employees while Johnson & Johnson employs over 125,000 employees in a more complex business structure. 288 Detailed
below, these large, complex business organizations allow the development of vocabulary, divided roles, and implicit
communication channels that facilitate the submission of false and fraudulent claims.
3. Hospice
Although not generally thought of as a core federal health expenditure, hospice - care for those patients with a diagnosis
of six months or less to live if a terminal illness runs its normal course - is one of the fastest growing costs of federal
reimbursement schemes, which began covering hospice in 1983. 289 According to the National Hospice and Palliative
Care Organization, the number of people using hospice increased from 495,000 in 1997 to 1.3 million in 2006--an
increase of 162% during 10 years. 290 While cancer remains the top diagnosis among hospice enrollments, its percentage
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is decreasing as more patients are referred to hospice with diagnoses like Alzheimer's, dementia, and failure to thrive.
Between 2002 and 2008, four in ten Medicare patients died while under the care of a hospice provider. 291
*317 The industry has changed form in response to the federal reimbursement scheme. In 1992, 13% of federally certified
hospices were for-profit; in 1999 that number swelled to 27%. 292 By 2002, that number had grown to 47%. 293 As of
2010, the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission estimated that there were 3,555 Medicare-certified hospices in the
United States, over half of which were for-profit providers. 294 For-profit providers accounted ‘almost entirely’ for the
increase in providers after 2002. 12 In addition to the growth of for-profit hospices, they are also growing larger and, in
those larger hospices, stays are getting longer. 295
These numbers are consistent with an aging population that is increasingly burdened by cancer, diabetes, and heart
disease. However, the numbers also reflect the enrollment of ineligible patients (in many cases, older people with virtually
nothing wrong with them) and provision of care not justified by federal reimbursement rules.
For initial admission to hospice, a patient's status must be certified by his or her attending physician and a physician
member of the hospice provider's interdisciplinary group; subsequent hospice periods need only to be certified by either
the attending physician or a hospice physician, not both. 296 In addition to being certified as terminally ill, when a
patient elects to enroll in hospice he or she must agree to forego curative care and receive only palliative care for terminal
illness. 297 A recipient may initially enroll for two ninety day periods, followed by an unlimited number of sixty day
periods. 298 The patient must be recertified as terminally ill at the beginning of each period of care after the first. 299
After eligibility is established, the federal hospice benefit generally provides four types of care: (1) inpatient respite care,
(2) general inpatient care, (3) routine home care, and (4) continuous home care. 300 Inpatient respite care allows for
short-term *318 inpatient hospice services to provide relief to the patient's primary caregiver. General inpatient care is
provided when the patient's pain and other symptoms cannot be adequately managed in any other setting. Routine home
care is intended to be the primary type of care that hospice services provide. These are the general services provided to
hospice patients; this care is usually given either at home or in a nursing facility. Routine home care provides the lowest
daily reimbursement rate to the hospice provider.
Continuous home care is also rendered at the patient's home or a nursing facility; however, it is only furnished when
medically necessary during a period of “crisis.” 301 Continuous care is intended to be short term and patients should not
generally be able to perform routine tasks or leave their place of care unnecessarily. Continuous or “crisis” care provides
the highest level of daily reimbursement to the hospice provider. Hospice providers have been shown not only to enroll
ineligible patients and keep ineligible patients on hospice care, but also to characterize their conditions so as to receive
higher reimbursements even when there was no clinical indication warranting higher reimbursement level care.
B. The Affordable Care Act's Focus on Healthcare Fraud
To be sure, the Affordable Care Act included provisions aimed at addressing some of the problems posed by the inevitable
increase in the submission of false claims, but it did not fundamentally alter the “pay and chase” model whereby claims
are paid first and investigated later. 302 Indeed, the bulk of Congressional action to address fraud under the ACA was
aimed at increasing the effectiveness of the Federal False Claims Act, ensuring that it would be the primary tool to
protect against the risk that fraud would jeopardize the integrity of the health care reform law.
1. Affordable Care Act Measures to Screen High-Risk Providers and Add Compliance Requirements
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The ACA created screening procedures for new health care providers seeking to obtain reimbursement, and imposed
new compliance *319 requirements on existing providers. 303 The new screening procedures included assessing the risk
levels of fraud, waste, and abuse by categories of providers. 304 The ACA mandated that the OIG establish standards
for provider compliance with reimbursement guidelines. 305 Providers could be subject to these compliance programs
for repeated suspicious or false claims. 306 Additionally, the ACA imposes requirements for providers to disclose any
affiliation with a provider that has “uncollected debt; has been or is subject to a payment suspension under a Federal
health care program[]; has been excluded from participation under [Medicare], [Medicaid], or [CHIP]; or has had its
billing privileges denied or revoked.” 307 Upon such a disclosure (which are rarely imposed and, then, only upon small
providers), the ACA allows CMS to deny or revoke enrollment if these affiliations pose an undue risk to the program's
integrity. 308 The Affordable Care Act provides $350 million over 10 years (FY 2011 through FY 2020) through the
Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account.
Finally, the ACA expanded the CMS “integrated data repository” to integrate data from all federal health care
programs. 309 The ACA notably mandated the centralization of claims data from Medicare, Medicaid and CHIP, the
Veterans Administration, the Department of Defense, the Social Security Disability Insurance program, and the Indian
Health Service in an effort to ease the job of law enforcement officials, such as HEAT strike forces, in identifying
fraudulent claims. 310 The ACA's data sharing provisions also authorized greater access on the part of DOJ and HHSOIG to claims and payment databases, and created a centralized repository of “false front providers” that have already
been identified as nefarious defrauders. 311
The ACA also altered Section 1877 of the Social Security Act, commonly referred to as the physician self-referral, or
“Stark” law. The law *320 forbids a physician from referring a patient to another medical provider or entity with whom
the referring physician has a financial relationship. 312 The law provides exceptions for ancillary services, such as x-rays
and lab tests, performed in-office. 313 Under the ACA, however, physicians must now inform patients of alternative,
out of office, sources for these ancillary services. 314 This change is predicated on the assumption that patients are
rational decision makers and will discount the convenience of the in-office service for a lower cost service elsewhere. 315
Additionally, the ACA has imposed strict limits and compliance guidelines on physician owned specialty hospitals. 316
To some extent, this provision of the law may simply drive physician run specialty hospitals out of the market, further
pressuring acquisition and consolidation by larger hospital systems. 317
2. The Affordable Care Act's False Claims Act Enhancements
Yet the attention Congress paid to the False Claims Act made clear that it would remain the centerpiece of Congressional
measures under the law to protect against fraud. The False Claims Act is the “the weapon of choice in the federal
government's battle against healthcare fraud.” 318 The Affordable Care Act explicitly expanded access to private litigants
suing under the False Claims Act. 319 First, Congress directly linked the retention of overpayments to false claim
liability. Under the Affordable Care Act, “overpayments” are defined as “any [Medicare or Medicaid] funds that a
person receives or retains . . . to which the person, after applicable reconciliation, is not entitled.” 320 Health care
providers, suppliers, Medicaid managed care organizations, Medicare Advantage organizations and drug plan sponsors
must “report and return” any overpayments within 60 days after either the date on which the overpayment was identified
or the date any corresponding cost report was due, whichever is later. 321 In addition, *321 members of the health care
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industry must submit notification in writing to the entity to which the overpayment was returned as to the reason of
the overpayment. 322
Second, Congress used the Affordable Care Act to expand access to whistleblowers who identify fraudulent practices
by allowing them to use publicly disclosed information. 323 Previously, such information was unavailable to them due
to limiting court decisions that fashioned a “Public Disclosure Bar” to claims that relied in significant part on publicly
available information. 324 Section 10104(j)(2) of the law replaces the prior version § 3730(e)(4) of the FCA with new
language that expands the scope of the original source exception and shifts the Public Disclosure Bar from a jurisdictional
prohibition to a more flexible standard, with discretionary power held by the government. 325 One important effect of
the change is to enable whistleblowers to use information available from a state Medicaid *322 hearing or process in
order to establish a claim under the FCA. 326 These FCA amendments are not limited to qui tam cases involving federal
health care programs. 327
In the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), Congress included enhancements to the FCA. Most
significantly for purposes of Medicare and Medicaid, Congress expanded the number of actors upon whom fraud would
support a “claim” under the FCA; included the retention of government overpayments as a basis for FCA liability;
broadened the scope of conspiracy under the FCA; enhanced protections for whistleblowers against retaliation; and,
bolstered the government's investigative powers. 328 For example, under judicial interpretations of the FCA prior to
FERA, a skilled nursing facility might contract out certain physical therapy treatments. 329 Because the physical therapy
provider did not directly submit claims to Medicare or Medicaid, an FCA claim could not stand against the therapist. 330
The amendments to the law corrected this defect. In the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(financial reform law), Congress created a uniform three-year statute of limitations period for claims of retaliation by
whistleblowers and widened FERA's definition of acts protected by the retaliation cause of action. 331 These measures
demonstrate an identifiable intent from Congress to use “private attorneys general” in the expanding areas in which
government payments are made and might be fraudulently obtained.
In 2003, Congress required Medicare (not Medicaid) to enact a pilot program whereby private auditing entities-recovery audit contractors (RACs)-- would be given incentive to hunt down overpayments or *323 improper billing
submissions by health care providers. 332 RACs typically review a sample of a health care provider's claims for a given
period and determine an error rate. RACs then generalize the error rate over the universe of claims during the audit
period to calculate an alleged overpayment amount. 333 The amount sought to be recouped by CMS based on the
extrapolation from a relatively small sample of claims billed can be large. The RACs are paid a contingency fee based
on the overpayment amount, which may provide their auditors with an incentive to find claims that they contend should
have been denied. Between 2005 and 2007, the private auditors returned $693.6 million to the Medicare Trust Funds. 334
The Affordable Care Act required States to contract with RACs for Medicaid audits. 335 As with FERA and the financial
reform law, the expansion of the RAC program shows a clear mandate from Congress to mobilize incentive-based
regulation of healthcare providers that submit claims for reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid. 336
The ACA has also made it easier for federal prosecutors to arraign defendants on criminal charges under the federal
Anti-Kickback statute. In addition to the traditionally proscribed acts of soliciting or taking bribes, the ACA expanded
the law to include any remuneration for referrals paid by a federal health care program. 337
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Read against the backdrop of these changes to the law under the Affordable Care Act and others, it is clear that Congress
was focused upon the problem of large healthcare providers or suppliers and how to ensure that they were accountable
for increased federal healthcare spending, both through the exchanges and through Medicaid. The use of collective *324
corporate knowledge to achieve this level of accountability is clear when seen in the broader context.
IV. COLLECTIVE CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE AND THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT
Despite the availability of enormous amounts of data available from pleadings and court documents, there has been
little if any scholarly effort to use False Claims Act litigation as a source for understanding the collective corporate
knowledge problem in any discipline, including law. 338 The government's theories range from deliberate systems design
at the management level that avoid effective training of personnel, diffusion of functions within the firm that ensure
that relevant knowledge will not reach decision-makers, the creation of specialized language within firms to obfuscate
questions relevant to submitting claims, as well as relatively straightforward allegations that one or more persons lied
to the government to steal taxpayer money. 339 These theories are equally likely to explain other problems involving
what corporations know and how that knowledge is managed--including for tortious conduct related to product liability,
concealing relevant information from investors, or averting detection of risks to employee or community safety. 340
The phenomena described below correspond to the healthcare sectors outlined above that have a disproportionate
influence on U.S. federal health spending. Similar phenomena are likely to occur in sectors that regularly contract with
the federal government like defense and munitions businesses, construction and civil engineering companies, technical
and management services corporations, as well as financial services firms that cause false claims to be submitted in
connection with federally insured or federally subsidized programs including housing and mortgages.
*325 A. Lexicology that Conceals Fraud
Specific words and phrases play an important role in characterizing fraudulent activity or in encouraging employees to
engage in fraudulent activity at the organizational level without knowing it at the individual level. For example, IPC,
an employer of hospitalists--physicians who work exclusively within a hospital-- has occupied a role in the market for
physicians by recruiting those with “little training or experience with appropriate billing procedures” and then creates a
script whereby physicians bill for the highest level of reimbursement from federal programs possible-- even when that is
not the accurate billing code. 341 In addition to encouraging physicians to think of consultations and interactions with
other medical providers as “complicated” for purposes of direct billing, IPC also adopts as part of its incentive system
language that encourages physicians to “catch up” to or “keep up” with high-billing peers, subtly suggesting that those
high performers are doing something right instead of achieving results through illegal upcoding. 342
When marketing its analgesic Bextra to physicians, Pfizer provided “scripts” to its sales agents that implied that Bextra
was approved at higher doses than FDA had actually authorized and suggested that evidence supported its superiority
to competitors. 343 The sales agents generally had no knowledge about the embedded, implied false statements regarding
the medication, which were fashioned by marketing directors who similarly had access to only narrow slices of the
overall picture of FDA approvals and safety risks for varying dosages of Bextra. 344 Similarly, Pfizer created promotional
materials for its sales agents that confused “acute pain” with the medical term for the specific kinds of pain approved by
FDA. 345 High level managers at Pfizer would distribute questions without answers, encouraging lower-level sales staff
to “fill in the blanks” with inaccurate, *326 false answers. 346 Sales staff were referred to as “Sharks” when receiving
instructions on sales strategies. 347
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In the hospice sector, the government's complaint alleges that Vitas Hospice Services, LLC, the largest hospice provider
in the U.S. and a subsidiary of the larger corporation, Chemed, that also controls Roto-Rooter, aggressively marketed
hospice to patients, patients' families, and sources of referrals such as doctors and hospitals, often as a general form of
skilled elder care rather than as a benefit intended for the terminally ill. 348 Vitas employees misled patients by referring
to continuous care--the highest reimbursement category--as “intensive comfort care” and represented that Medicare
would routinely cover round-the-clock care in the absence of acute symptoms. 349 In fact, hospice employees stated
that “intensive comfort care” was available any time the patient was experiencing symptoms which “caus[ed] distress
to the patient or family.” 350 Nurses routinely arrived at the homes or care facilities of continuous care patients to
find the patients had left to attend social activities or were able to perform activities of daily living with little or no
assistance. 351 Members of the medical staff were also ordered to begin continuous home care without a physician's
order. 352 These practices were enabled by either willful or neglectful failures to educate employees as to continuous
care eligibility criteria. 353
Even when effective monitoring systems are in place, large business organizations may circumvent those systems by
characterizing a practice or service in another way. For example, subsidiaries of Tenet Health Systems, a healthcare
provider with 130,000 employees in at least two countries, entered into an agreement to provide “interpreter services”
to clinics that served primarily undocumented pregnant Hispanic women when the arrangement appeared to in
fact compensate that clinic for referring patients *327 to Tenet for their Medicaid-covered deliveries. 354 The
characterization allowed the agreement to evade corporate legal review. 355
B. Signaling Tolerance of Fraud Through Hiring and Promotion Policies
In large firms, hiring, retention, and promotion decisions may be used to incentivize managers and employees to engage
in fraudulent or illegal activity, while leaving scripts promoting those activities unstated and unwritten. These policies
are often inextricably linked to the adoption of language structures that mask fraudulent activities described above.
As part of a nationwide scheme to increase inpatient admissions of patients eligible for federal reimbursement,
Community Health Systems, Inc., the nation's largest hospital operator, adopted a policy whereby emergency room
directors were required to provide written justifications for not admitting those patients after they received treatment in
an emergency room. 356 Hospitals have also relieved employees of their oversight responsibilities where they identified
improper billing practices as well as demotion and dismissal. 357
During Eli Lilly's campaign to “convert” patients taking competing drugs to its Prozac Weekly, Zyprexa, Evista, and
Humulin pharmaceutical lines, sales representatives that engaged in practices that violated its “Red Book” of good sales
practices were promoted. 358 Relatedly, sales representatives who identified sales practices that suggested unethical or
illegal behavior were “reprimanded and . . . forced to resign” from the company. 359 Sales representatives' performance
was measured by the number of off-label speakers and audio conferences each was able to arrange. 360
*328 In the hospice context, patients have been referred to in aggregate as “census” and employees are rewarded
for growing “census” and, correspondingly, sanctioned, demoted or fired for not meeting or exceeding “census”
expectations. 361 The effect of the policies is to encourage employees to enroll ineligible patients for hospice care, and to
retain those patients on hospice even after it becomes clear that they are not eligible:
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Job retention at AseraCare was linked to maintaining census, or the number of patients for whom
AseraCare could bill Medicare or other insurance. An auditor that AseraCare hired to review its internal
hospice operations observed in its December 28, 2007 report that a decline in the number of patients
was accompanied by a “reduction-in-force,” which in turn, made staff, concerned about losing their jobs,
resistant to discharging patients. Specifically, the auditor, in its review of the Monroeville, Alabama office,
cautioned that “[AseraCare] [s]taff are resistant to patient discharge” and are “concerned about layoffs if
census drops.” 362

Another hospice provider “took adverse employment actions against sales representatives who did not meet monthly
admissions goals” but paid bonuses based on the number of patient admissions and the length of time they could get
a patient to stay on hospice services. 363
C. Shaping False Claims Through Training and Non-Training
Related both to the adoption of specific vocabulary, incentives and sanctions, firms also use the structure and content
of training materials, or non-training in relevant federal payment conditions to encourage managers and employees to
participate in activities that lead to false claims submissions.
In its complaint against IPC, the Hospitalist Company, the U.S. identified corporate training as an explanatory variable
in physician billing practices:
*329 IPC trains and encourages its hospitalists to upcode. IPC's training can be seen by comparing the
billing records of IPC hospitalists when they first joined IPC with the billing records of those same IPC
hospitalists after they have received IPC's training and become assimilated into IPC's fraudulent culture.
A review of the billing records submitted by 5IPC hospitalists when they initially joined IPC reveals that
those hospitalists, in connection with the patient admissions process, billed at the lowest level 6.9 of the
time, the intermediate level 58.6% of the time, and the highest level 34.5% of the time. After receiving IPC's
training, however, those percentages changed dramatically: those same hospitalists did not submit a single
bill at the lowest level; only 8.9o/o of the bills were at the intermediate level; and over 9l% of the bills were
submitted at the highest level. The same pattern is evidenced in the bills submitted by those hospitalists in
connection with patient discharge services. Before receiving IPC's training, those hospitalists used the lower
of two possible discharge codes 93.3% of the time. After receiving IPC's training, those same hospitalists
did not submit a single bill at the lowest level. 364

This training is not as a general matter provided by physicians, but rather specially-trained staff who conduct one-onone sessions that are in many ways not consistent with publicly available Medicare guidelines. Similarly Community
Health Systems, Inc., the largest publicly traded operator of hospitals in the United States by number of facilities and
net operating revenue, adopted an upcoding scheme by replacing medical staff with “case managers” to dictate patient
discharge summaries. 365 Those case managers received “coding education that was designed to” increase billing to
federal programs. 366
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In promoting unapproved uses for its blockbuster antidepressant Wellbutrin, GlaxoSmithKline distributed to its
salesforce audiotapes from *330 an ostensibly neutral physician for unapproved uses of the drug before even fully
instructing them on the only indication approved by the FDA-- depression. 367 As part of marketing its post-menopausal
osteoporosis treatment drug Evista, Eli Lilly promoted the use of free heel scans combined with coupons for free first
time prescriptions of Evista. 368 The heel scans were known to generate “false positives” for osteoporosis. 369 Physicians
were provided with the machine, a nurse/operator for the machine, as well as the Medicare reimbursement code for
the test. 370 “Lilly provided no information to the doctors or its sales representatives describing the severe diagnostic
limitations of the heel tests.” 371
In its complaint against Vitas Hospice Services, LLC, the U.S. government outlines similar behavior with respect to
Medicare eligibility rules for hospice admission and retention, noting that “One [medical director] stated that he received
no training at all from Vitas on Medicare eligibility requirements for hospice, and that Vitas expected him to certify
patients as eligible for hospice without making actual determinations that the patient had a prognosis of six months
or less if their illness ran its normal course.” 372 In order to ensure that patients would meet the medical criteria to be
enrolled in hospice, Vitas either provided their medical staff with inadequate training or no training in the requirements
for enrollment under Medicare. 373 Physicians and nurses who were aware of the proper policies were encouraged to
bend or ignore Medicare rules. 374 Members of the medical staff were expected to enroll patients without regard for their
life expectancy or medical necessity. 375 Vitas also employed field nurses to provide care to its hospice patients residing
in skilled nursing facilities, assisted living facilities, and hospitals, but did not provide them adequate *331 training
on the eligibility requirements for the Medicare hospice benefit. 376 Vitas directed these untrained field nurses, as part
of their job duties, to identify elderly people who were eligible for the Medicare hospice benefit, and to encourage the
referral of elderly people to Vitas for end of life care.
D. Federal False Claims Act Litigation as a Source for Understanding How Institutions Shape Individual Behavior
These aspects of firm organization that facilitate illegal activity are intended to represent only three broad observations
from false claims act litigation brought against healthcare or pharmaceutical firms. There are no doubt dozens or
hundreds of additional patterns, systems, and structures that would inform current scholarship examining how firms
affect individual behavior. In 2013 alone, 752 federal False Claims Act suits were filed, providing a trove of information
revealed through initial complaints, answers, discovery disputes, dispositive motions, evidentiary submissions, and posttrial motions (although, as with most civil litigation, false claims act cases settle at a high rate). 377
Yet neither legal scholars nor academics in other disciplines have fully appreciated the usefulness of False Claims
Act litigation for one of the central questions debated across disciplinary lines. In the legal context, scholars are
overwhelmingly focused on the False Claims Act's qui tam mechanism. 378 David Freeman Engstrom has published
a number of studies examining the False Claims Act's whistleblower provisions in the context of optimal regulatory
design. 379 Anthony Casey and Anthony Niblett examined the False Claims Act whistleblower provisions in contrast to
the *332 SEC whistleblower provisions adopted as part of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act. 380 Health law
scholars like Zack Buck, Joan Krause and David Kwok have focused on the effectiveness of the False Claims Act in
securing the integrity of federally supported health programs generally (or accompanying problems like overtreatment),
but have not examined the law for its relevance to how firms organize themselves and how fraud is perpetrated as a
matter of economic organization. 381 Indeed, the body of scholarship devoted to the False Claims Act and collective
corporate knowledge is largely written by members of the defense bar. 382
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Conversely, few scholars in the business ethics, communications, economics, or sociology disciplines resort to False
Claims Act litigation when examining questions related to collective corporate behavior. Some attention is paid to specific
episodes that tangentially implicate the False Claims Act-- like Lance Armstrong's liability to USPS for false statements
on doping--but for the most part, publicly available litigation documents are not a principal source for scholars studying
the problems of a firm's economic organization. 383
What makes False Claims Act litigation even richer as a source for examination of collective corporate behavior is the role
of dedicated *333 compliance systems that are intended to prevent violations of the law governing claims submissions.
The US Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General has promulgated guidelines for voluntary
compliance programs for entities throughout the health care industry which serve as a template for, especially, large
providers. 384 The forms of fraud perpetrated by the large, complex business organizations analyzed above operate
within these compliance systems, and in some cases, because of them.
Even where DOJ or HHS guidance does not provide the source of the compliance mechanism, violations of the False
Claims Act are also undertaken by large business organizations operating under corporate integrity agreements, i.e.,
parts of settlements for prior violations that require adoption of policies intended to thwart reemergence of people or
processes that increase the risk of submission of fraudulent claims. 385 The purpose of a CIA is to establish a compliance
program to, “provide for systemic and meaningful scrutiny of all claims. . .to assure that they will conform to program
guidelines and are not fraudulent.” 386 Corporate integrity agreements are regularly used in settlements against large
firms that have defrauded government funded healthcare services. 387 Corporate integrity agreements are tailored to
meet the specific defendant, but also generally contain the eight following components; 1) the hiring of a compliance
officer and/or the appointment of a compliance committee; 2) the development of written standards and policies; 3) the
implementation of an employee training program; 4) the retention of an independent auditor; 5) the establishment of a
confidential disclosure program; 6) restricting the employment of ineligible persons; 7) the establishment of a system for
reporting overpayments or other reportable events; and finally; 8) the establishment of a system to report compliance to
the relevant government entity (usually the Office of the Inspector General). 388 Thus, not only may specific corporate
structures be analyzed using information available *334 through False Claims Act litigation, but also variables specific
to firms that already operate substantial compliance regimes.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the federal False Claims Act represents both an underappreciated source of data for
investigating how firms shape individual behavior as well as a future challenge to the financial security of the 2010 Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act. At the heart of both those oversights is the role of collective corporate knowledge.
The Article argues that the legislative history behind the False Claims Act endorse an approach by federal courts whereby
the government is allowed to advocate a theory of collective corporate knowledge in proving false claims cases which,
in turn, is subject to an affirmative defense available to defendants whereby they plead and prove that a false claim was
the result of mistake or mere negligence.
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Verkerke, supra note 79, at 931.
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IOWA L. REV. 697, 698-702 (2002).
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Bran Lewis & Steven Woodward, Corporate Criminal Liability, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 923, 940 (2014).
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Murphy, supra note 81, at 699.
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87

ETHICS RES. CTR., THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES FOR ORGANIZATIONS AT TWENTY
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COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS 30 (2012).
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DAVID O. FRIEDRICHS, TRUSTED CRIMINALS: WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY
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Id. at § 3730(b).
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the Act, 8 HEALTH LAW 1, 3 (1996).
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See, e.g.,United States ex rel. Wilkins v. United Health Grp., Inc., No. 08-3425, 2010 WL 1931134, at *3 (D.N.J. May 13,
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Id. On December 4, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Universal Health Services, Inc. v. United States
ex rel. Escobar, No. 15-7, to review “implied certification” theories of liability under the federal False Claims Act (FCA).
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See generally Eric H. Holder, U.S. Department of Justice, Memo: Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health
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© 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.

42

Harbison, Ashley 10/16/2017
For Educational Use Only

COLLECTIVE CORPORATE KNOWLEDGE AND THE..., 68 Baylor L. Rev. 265

190

Miller v. Holzmann, 563 F. Supp. 2d 54, 99 (D.D.C. 2008).
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1, 893-95 (D.D.C. 2006).
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Plaintiffs' Proposed Jury Instruction No. 50, Tr. at 54-55, Miller v. Bill Harbert Int'l Constr., Inc., No. 95-CV-01231, 2007
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352 F.3d 908, 918 n.9 (4th Cir. 2003).
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Id. at 1263.
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